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Nixon: Constitutional Law - An Indigent's Right to a Free Transcript - M

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-An Indigent's Right to a Free Trial Transcript. Mayer
v. City of Chicago, 92 S. Ct. 410 (1971).

Mayer was a medic at a demonstration who came upon
an injured person and was confronted by a policeman while
ministering to him.' Mayer was charged with disorderly conduct and interference with a policeman. The maximum fine
for each offense was $500, but Mayer was given only a $250
fine on each offense in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois. He petitioned the Circuit Court for a free transcript
of the proceedings for use on appeal. His stated grounds of
appeal were that the evidence was insufficient for conviction
and that misconduct of the prosecutor had denied him a fair
trial.2 Other alternatives to a free transcript under the Illinois Supreme Court rules were the "Settled Statement" and
the "Agreed Statement of Facts". But Mayer did not resort
to either alternative. The Circuit Court found he was an indigent but denied his application for the transcript on the
grounds that the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 607(b) provided free transcripts only for appeals on felony convictions.'
The Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition in an unreported order.' Mayer then challenged the constitutionality
of Rule 607(b) as limited to felony cases by appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.5 The Court held that it was
constitutional error to deny an indigent appellant's application for a free transcript on the basis of a rule which distinguishes between a felony and lesser crimes or even between the
possibility of imprisonment and a fine. The Court further
held that where the appellant's grounds for appeal indicate
the need of a transcript that he need not meet the burden of
showing the inadequacy of alternatives; this burden is to be
placed on the State.'
1. Mayer v. City of Chicago, No. 70-5040 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 1970) 10 Ca. L.
REP. 4029-30.
2. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 92 S. Ct. 410, 412 (1971).
S. Id. at 413.
4. Id. at 414.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 416-17.
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An indigent's right to a free trial transcript, which is expanded in the principal case, has developed from the indigent's
right to appeal. This right is not an explicit guarantee of the
Federal Constitution. However, the Supreme Court has held
that, once this appeal is granted by a statutory scheme, there
must be no difference between the kind of appeal provided the
indigent and that provided the defendant who is able to pay.
The components which make the appeal meaningful must be
granted These rights primarily are the right to counsel and
the right to a trial transcript.
Historically the development of the right to counsel provided for in the sixth amendment paralleled the development
of the right to a jury trial.' The sixth amendment also guarantees a jury trial in "all criminal prosecutions".' The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana ° refused to provide a
jury for all criminal prosecutions by narrowly holding that
a jury was required for a serious offense, which in Duncan
was a two year prison sentence." However, Duncan refused to
draw the line between a serious offense and a petty offense
with any designated prison term.' 2 In the federal system a
petty offense is defined as one punishable by no more than
six months in prison or a $500 fine. 3 The Supreme Court in
Baldwin v. New York 4 more recently accepted the challenge
of drawing the line and concluded "I[t]hat no offense can be
deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.' " No person can be denied a jury where the possible
The Constitupenalty exceeds six months imprisonment.'
tion, if broadly interpreted, should arguably provide a jury
trial for all criminal prosecutions including those for crimes
which require imprisonment for less than six months or which
7. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 161.
18 U.S.C. §1915 (1970).
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 74.
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Yet the Court limited this right just as it

limited the right to counsel.
The sixth amendment also guarantees a right to counsel
in" all criminal prosecutions.""8 The constitutional guarantee
of the right to counsel does not address itself to the problem
of the indigent and the state's duty to supply counsel. Not
0 did the Supreme Court grant
until Gideon v. Wainwright"
to the indigent the right to counsel. Florida law appointed
counsel only in capital offenses, so the indigent charged with
a noncapital felony had to provide his own counsel..2 ' The
Court held that the sixth amendment's right to counsel in
criminal prosecutions applied to the states under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause."1 Under this application, one lacking funds to pay legal fees must be granted coun2
sel in state trials. On the same date Douglas v. California1
was decided. The California District Court had " '[g]one
through' the record and had come to the conclusion that 'no
good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel' "
for the indigent defendant." The indigent's access to counsel
depended on the judge's discretion to grant it. The substitution of his judgment for the right to counsel or right to appeal
was held to be a violation of equal protection for the poor
which thus violated the fourteenth amendment. 4
The Supreme Court next, in Coleman v. Alabama,"
indicated an expansion of the right to counsel by requiring
it in a preliminary hearing, which it deemed a critical stage
of the criminal process.2 6 However, as of yet the Court has
not recognized the right to counsel for those indigents facing
imprisonment for less than six months or merely fines. In
Argersinger v. Hamlin,' which is now before the Supreme
Court on reargument, petitioner asked on oral argument that
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 75.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 342.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Id. at 354-55.
Id. at 358.
399 U.S. 1 (1970).
Id. at 9-10.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, No. 70-5015 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1971), 10 CR. L. REP.
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the right to counsel be expanded for indigents facing any
imprisonment. 8 Although the requested expansion dealt
only with imprisonments, the ruling in Argersinger may be
broader. Yet, the Court may instead draw the line at six
months. If the Court limits the right to counsel as indicated,
it will parallel the accused's right to jury trial at six months
imprisonment. This convergence is only sensible since a right
to jury trial would be practically meaningless without counsel
to defend the indigent before a jury. Whether one may argue
that all limits should be withdrawn, it should at least be
admitted that lines should be drawn at the same place.
Unlike the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel, the
right to a trial transcript is not guaranteed explicitly in the
Federal Constitution but was developed through case law on
the theory that once an appeal is granted the right to a transcript for use by a defense attorney is necessary to execute the
appeal properly. The prosecutor employs a similar document
supplied at the state's expense. The transcript is useful to
detect possible errors upon which an appeal may be granted
and is evidence for impeachment of witnesses at a new trial.2 9
However, before Griffin v. Illinoiss° the appellant's acquisition of a transcript was conditioned on his ability to pay for it.
The Court in Griffin held that the denial of a free transcript
to an indigent violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
Destitute defendents must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendents who have money
enough to buy transcripts."
The Griffin case, although limited by the facts to a free
transcript for a felony conviction, set precedent for a panorama of appeals. Ramifications spread from misdemeanor
charges to felony charges. In Williams v. Oklahoma City,"
the Court granted a free transcript to an indigent who was
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 4099.
Britt v. North Carolina, 92 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1971).
Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 7.
Id. at 19.
395 U.S. 458 (1969).
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convicted of drunken driving for which a 90 day jail sentence
and a $50 fine were imposed." The Court thus provided the
right to a free transcript to an indigent sentenced for a term
less than the six month imprisonment term required for the
application of the right to counsel and the right to jury trial.
As in Coleman, which recognized the right to counsel for a pro5 paralliminary hearing,3" the Court in Roberts v. LaVallee"
leled that holding by ruling that an indigent man must receive
a free transcript of the preliminary hearing before trial.
As in Griffin, refusal was construed to be a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." Several Supreme Court cases have required free transcripts for
indigents for the preparation of appellate hearings in habeas
corpus proceedings. 7 Yet, the Supreme Court has refused to
rule on whether a free transcript for collateral relief should
be provided.3" In another parallel to the right to counsel,
the Court in two cases refused to substitute for full appellate
review the trial judge's conclusions that an indigent's appeal
was frivolous or that no reversible error existed. 9 Thus, the
indigent must be granted full appellate review and a free trial
transcript.
As the above rulings indicate, the Supreme Court has
steadily expanded the circumstances which give rise to an indigent's right to a free transcript. But two bombshells hit
41
when Mayer v. City of Chicago" and Britt v.North Carolina
were decided on the same day. Mayer ruled that an indigent
had a right to a free transcript for appeal even when the indigent was merely fined.42 Previously the accused must have
faced a possible prison sentence. While this decision did not
guarantee a complete transcript in all cases, it required "a
33.
84.
35.
36.
37.
BB.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
389 U.S. 40 (1967).
Id. at 41.
E.g., Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Long v. District Court of
Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 286 (1970) (dictum). The Court will not
decide whether free trial transcripts will be afforded for collateral relief
petitions until it appears that petitioner cannot borrow a transcript from
either the state or from his co-defendant.
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
92 S. Ct. 410 (1971).
92 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra note 40, at 416-17.
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record of sufficient completeness," which would be an alternative sufficient for the particular cases.4" Moreover, the burden is on the "State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."4 4
The state attempted to defend its refusal to afford transcripts in cases where no imprisonment resulted by proposing
a balancing between the burden imposed upon the individual
and the cost to the state. In rejecting this possibility the Court
noted, "A fine may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as
forced confinement." The Court further commented that the
State's long term interest does not lie in arbitrarily restricting
the right to a transcript to instances where a jail sentence
was invoked.4" This refusal might run the "risk of generating frustration and hostility toward its courts among the
most numerous consumers of justice.""
In Britt an indigent was denied a free transcript upon a
mistrial." Yet the result in Britt was dependent upon its
peculiar facts. The trial took place in a small town. The
court reporter was a good friend of all local lawyers and was
reporting at the second trial. The Court reasoned that an
alternative to a trial transcript would have been supplied if
counsel had requested it. A suitable alternative would have
required the court reporter to "read back to counsel his notes
...well in advance of the second trial. "" The opinion followed the rule set forth in Mayer. It reasoned that the appellant was not required to show that a complete transcript was
necessary. The burden was instead upon the state to show
that other alternatives were satisfactory. But here the state
was not required to carry the burden since the appellant
conceded "he had available an informal alternative which appear[ed] to be substantially equivalent to a transcript. "
Thus, the transcript was denied only because of the appellant's
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Britt v. North Carolina, supra note 41, 435.
Id. at 434-35.
Id.
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concession. The result in Britt, however, cannot be entirely
disregarded, and yet it appears to be a maverick in the expanding line of free transcript cases.
CONCLUSION

One aspect of the Mayer case is that it failed to adhere to
the lines drawn in the right to counsel and right to jury cases.
The latter rights are afforded a defendant only when the
offense for which he is charged may be punished by imprisonment for a term longer than six months. The result of this
disparity5 0 may be that the indigent's right to a free trial
transcript for a conviction punishable by fine or by less than
six months imprisonment will be meaningless without the right
of free counsel who can argue from the transcript. Likewise,
the right to jury trial will be of little advantage without the
indigent's right to free counsel to argue the case before the
jury. Although the Mayer case may be expansive, its effect
will not be so unless the other two rights are uniformly expanded. One may feel such expansion is warranted or unwarranted, but all must admit that uniformity alone will be
effective.
Another aspect of Mayer lies in its financial effect. A
free transcript for every indigent who wishes an appeal from
a conviction punishable by fine may overburden the court
system. Some estimate of the cost to a county might be calculated by considering an indigent's case in a Wyoming court.
If the accused is charged with a capital offense, a jury
must be sequestered and the county must pay room and board
during the trial.5 ' The jury members are also paid $12.00 per
diem." Regarding trials for other felonies and misdemeanors,
the judge has the discretion to sequester the jurors." He may,
50. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 (1971). This case held that a state
law which prevented a change in venue for a jury trial where a misdemeanor
is charged violated the fourteenth amendment. This case and the right to
transcript cases may have begun a trend which will eliminate impediments
to the right to counsel and right to jury trial in cases where the sentence
is less than six months.
51. WYO. STAT. § 7-237 (1957).
52. Wyo. STAT. § 1-136 (Supp. 1971).
53. WYO. STAT. § 7-237 (1957).
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however, choose not to separate the jury. The county must
then pay daily mileage expenses of ten cents per mile for those
who live at least five miles from the court. 4 An accused indigent is allowed two witnesses at county expense and additional
witnesses if the accused shows that more are necessary to his
case and if the court deems them necessary." Each witness
is paid $10.00 per diem. An expert witness is paid $25.00 per
diem. The county pays the county attorney to prosecute, 7 the
assigned defense counsel,58 and the clerk of court.59 The defense
counsel is paid a maximum of $500 for a capital offense.6" A
recent Wyoming court record indicates that the costs of a capital offense trial can be substantial even without a transcript."
If a 500 page transcript is included at seventy-five cents per
page,62 this will be an added burden to a county which may not
have the funds to pay the total cost imposed upon it. The
effect of these special costs may be that the county will not try
many capital offenses. On the other end of the spectrum, the
factor of costs may reduce the number of lesser offenses tried.
Because assigned counsels' fees are so meager, some have
been placed in ruinous circumstances by defending indigents.
In People v. Randolph," five attorneys defended four prisoners in a trial which was extraordinary in complexity and
duration.64 After suffering great loss, they requested $31,000
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

WYO. STAT. § 1-135 (Supp. 1971).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-245-7 (1957).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-195 (Supp. 1971).
WYO. STAT. § 18-74 (Supp. 1971).
Wyo. R. CRim. P. 6 (a).
WYO. STAT. § 18-74 (Supp. 1971).
Wyo. STAT. § 7-9 (Supp. 1971).
District Court Record from Albany County, Wyoming. The record lists the
total trial expense to the county in the case of State v. Mares, a capital
offense case (1971). It excludes attorney expenses.
Jury Fees .$1,627.80
Witnesses
2,106.20
Rooms
525.00
Meals
677.50
Bailiff's Charges .-----------570.00
Guard Charges ..-....
736.00
Total
$6,242.50
62. Wyo. STAT. §5-82 (Supp. 1971).
63. People v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966).
64. Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?
52 Miss. L. J. 32, 37 (1971).
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in expenses and fees. The trial court ordered payment but
the county asserted its inability to pay."8 Although the statute
involved limited compensation to $500 per case, the Illinois
Supreme Court held the statute could not be applied
where it appears that counsel could not serve without great
financial burden. Since the county was unable to pay, the
State of Illinois was ultimately held liable. 6
The Wyoming Statutes likewise provide only small payment to assigned defense counsel. The maximum for a capital
offense is $500, for a felony is $250, and for a misdemeanor
is $100.67 If indigents' defense attorneys demand larger fees
and if free transcript costs are added to other county costs,
the state may well have to assume part of the burden.
The element of cost may have another effect on the conduct of the litigation. The prosecution may rest its initial decision to charge a suspect upon financial considerations. The
prosecutor is aware that if every defendant stood trial, the
government could not finance the total expense. The criminal, too, recognizes this fact.6 9 From this awareness the process of plea bargaining arises. The accused will plead guilty
in exchange for a reduced charge." At the judicial level, to a
judge who may be seeking an excuse to show leniency, the
guilty plea may be this excuse. One judge stated, "Most
judges usually state for the record words to the effect that
'since the defendant has saved the government the time and
expense of a trial, the sentence is less than it ordinarily would
be.' " 71
The impact of cost-induced plea bargaining may be uneven and unfair. The innocent accused may negotiate a plea
for fear that his insistence on a trial could substantially increase his sentence if he is found guilty. On the other hand,
People v. Randolph, supra note 63, at 339.
Id. at 342.
Wyo. STAT. § 7-9 (Supp. 1971).
United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1960), quoting
LUMMAS, THE TRIAL JUDE 46-47 (this book is no longer in print).
69. Id.
70. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GuiLT OR INNOCENCE WITH65.
66.
67.
68.

OUT TRIAL

97 (1966).

71. United States v. Wiley, supra note 68, at 684.
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the guilty accused may negotiate a disposition disproprotionate to his actual guilt in return for lessening the burden upon
the system by his plea.
Regardless of one's opinion about the advantages of a
full trial as opposed to a reduced charge, the Mayer case and
its possible ramifications on the right to counsel and the
right to a jury trial may pose cost questions to counties. These
questions may result in negotiated dispositions or may force
the counties to look for finances from other sources.
SUNNY J. NIXON
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